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THE GROWTH OF INTERDISCIPLINARY 
RESEARCH AND THE INDUSTRIAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE PRODUCTION 
OF LEGAL IDEAS: A REPLY TO 
JUDGE EDWARDS 
George L. Priest* 
Judge Edwards' lively essay1 declaims what he regards as the in-
creasing disjunction between the substance of modem legal education 
and scholarship and the needs and interests of the judiciary and the 
practicing bar. According to Judge Edwards, law schools and law 
firms are moving in opposite directions. Law schools have increas-
ingly abandoned real world legal problems in favor of abstract inter-
disciplinary theory, with a consequent diminution in their 
contribution toward solving problems faced by the judiciary. At the 
same time, law firms are becoming increasingly profit oriented, with-
out regard to pursuing broader social interests. To combat these de-
velopments, Judge Edwards proposes that legal education be 
substantially reformed: he proposes greater production of "practical" 
- by which he means more purely doctrinal and noninterdisciplinary 
- scholarship, greater credit to practical scholars, more explicitly 
doctrinal teaching, and greater attention to the teaching of legal ethics, 
defined not simply as mastery of the canons, but as the understanding 
of the law as an instrument to promote the public interest. 
Judge Edwards views me as a particularly pernicious advocate of 
the developments he seeks to reverse. In talks given some years ago, I 
described the increasing influence upon legal scholarship and teaching 
of interdisciplinary research in the s<;:>cial sciences and humanistic 
studies - philosophy and interpretation. I described the modern law 
school as itself coming to resemble a university, with a curriculum 
consisting of minigraduate courses in applied economics, social theory, 
and political science.2 To me, these developments implied, first, a 
• John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. - Ed. Unintention-
ally, but undoubtedly, this essay draws on remarks of my colleague John H. Langbein at the 1993 
Yale Law School graduation. He is not responsible, however, for any of the conclusions. 
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). 
2. George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as Univer-
sity, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437 (1983). 
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challenge to the distinctive significance of law as a subject of study 
and, second, an increasing division between the academy and the bar.3 
Unlike Judge Edwards, however, I applauded the trend. 
Judge Edwards' opposition to this work could not be stronger. He 
explicitly rejects the "'graduate school' model of legal education," 
which he attributes to me.4 He criticizes what he regards as my "arro-
gant, antidoctrinal bias."5 He describes what he regards as my "dis-
dain for law practice" as "deplorable."6 Moreover, he concludes that 
arguments such as mine, which seem to encourage the growing dis-
junction between legal education and the legal profession, are "utterly 
specious. "7 
The article of mine most criticized by Judge Edwards is now over a 
decade old8 and, upon rereading it, I can appreciate the source of 
Judge Edwards' dismay. Though I believe that the article accurately 
describes current developments in legal education, it does not ade-
quately explain their source or the determinants of the relationship 
between modem legal scholarship and the problems facing the judici-
ary and the bar. The article, and a successor,9 focus, I now believe 
simplistically, upon participants in the dissemination of legal ideas 
who most clearly differ - advanced theoreticians and the practicing 
bar - without any explanation of the participants or institutions that 
intermediate between them. In addition - though this is a point that 
Judge Edwards did not criticize - the article contains an evaluation 
of the importance of legal study that modem events have demon-
strated to me to be a severe underestimate. 10 
This brief response will attempt to repair these various deficiencies, 
though only in part because of the difficulty of the subject. It will try 
to explain more fully the rise of interdisciplinary legal research and 
will sketch the broader structure of the production and dissemination 
of new ideas about law and the legal system. The relationship between 
legal education and legal practice implicates an understanding of the 
"market" for legal ideas. To describe ideas as the subject of a "mar-
ket," of course, has become conventional. In my view, however, the 
3. George L. Priest, The Increasing Division Between Legal Practice and Legal Education, 31 
BUFF. L. REv. 681 (1989). 
4. Edwards, supra note l, at 40. 
5. Id. I am slightly comforted that, at a later point, Judge Edwards describes the approach 
of another author as "considerably more arrogant" than mine. Id. at 52 n.53. 
6. Id. at 52. 
7. Id. at 76. 
8. Priest, supra note 2. 
9. Priest, supra note 3. 
10. See infra note 35. 
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market metaphor most typically distorts our understanding of the is-
sue, because few of the typical characteristics of economic markets are 
present in the dissemination of ideas. This essay will try to approach a 
description of a market, nevertheless, by illustrating similarities be-
tween the production of legal ideas within law schools and the bar and 
the production of intellectual property in more familiar industrial con-
texts. The description will be far from comprehensive, but it will sug-
gest that the alleged "disjunction" between legal education and 
practice, the focus of Judge Edwards' essay as well as of my own ear-
lier writing, does not adequately account for the broader process at 
work. The essay will also suggest that many of the developments in 
modern legal education that Judge Edwards so severely criticizes11 ac-
tually support, rather than conflict with, the broader values that he 
espouses. 
Part I attempts to explain more fully than did my earlier articles 
why legal scholarship and education are increasingly dominated by 
interdisciplinary studies in contrast to the doctrinal, practical work 
that Judge Edwards prefers. Part II will address the alleged "disjunc-
tion" between the legal academy and the bar by beginning a descrip-
tion of the structure of production and dissemination of legal ideas. 
Finally, Part III will address Judge Edwards' proposals more 
specifically. 
I. THE REALIST INFLUENCE ON LAW AND THE STEADILY 
INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 
There is little question that the most significant development in 
American law of the past century has been the realist revolution lead-
ing to the broader understanding of law and legal doctrine as instru-
ments of social policy. Following the realists, it is no longer sufficient 
to defend legal doctrine on the mere grounds that a rule is a rule, or 
that the doctrine derives from time immemorial. Rather, it is neces-
sary to show that the doctrine has a beneficial effect on the society, is 
an expression of an important public value, or otherwise serves the 
public interest. I shall not defend here this characterization of the 
impact of realism; it is hardly controversial. I do not believe that 
Judge Edwards would disagree. Indeed, this approach toward the law 
is an important component of Judge Edwards' advocacy of "ethical 
11. This essay generally ignores developments at the Harvard Law School, the subject of 
much of Judge Edwards' criticism. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 37 {describing the "recent 
fiasco"); see also id. at 39-40, 51 n.52. While the Harvard situation may be explained in part by 
the process I discuss, it may also be sui generis. 
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practice." 12 
This change in the understanding of the role of law, however, had 
important implications for legal scholarship and teaching. Both had 
to be redirected necessarily toward illumination of the functions and 
philosophical underpinnings of the law. Judge Edwards himself de-
scribes the change: the prerealist Langdellian view that a student 
could understand the law from no more than the texts of then-domi-
nant cases is no longer adequate. 13 Instead, it is necessary today, in 
Judge Edwards' words, to "integrate theory with doctrine, because 
both are relevant to the practitioner and governmental 
decisionmaker."14 
Nevertheless, although Judge Edwards seems to support strongly 
the greater attention legal academics give to the role of law in fulfilling 
social values or serving the public interest, much of what he criticizes 
in modern legal scholarship and education is the direct effect of the 
postrealist change in approach. First, the realist revolution challenges 
law and the legal system as distinctive social institutions. If a legal 
rule is viewed as an instrument of social policy or as an expression of 
public values, then it must be compared with other available instru-
ments for the achievement of similar ends. The distinctive position of 
law necessarily diminishes. Secondly, the realist revolution challenges 
the insularity and uniqueness of legal reasoning and analysis. If ·a legal 
rule is viewed as an instrument for imparting a beneficial societal ef-
fect, expressing a value, or otherwise achieving the public interest, it is 
surely as important to study the societal effect, the value, and the defi-
nition of the public interest as it is to study the legal mechanism em-
ployed to achieve it.1s 
Most importantly, given the realist revolution, greater interdisci-
plinary study of law and the legal system follows directly. Judge Ed-
wards sharply criticizes the rise of interdisciplinary "law-and" 
scholarship and teaching in favor of greater attention to legal doc-
12. Judge Edwards defines "ethical" practice variously: Id. at 66 ("concern for the public 
interest"); id. at 67 ("to advance some causes that he or she believes to be just"); id. at 69 ("to 
view his or her legal knowledge ..• as a set of norms"); id. at 72 ("When I practiced law ••• we 
felt the work was ... valuable to society .... "); id. at 73 (" '[E]thical graduates' .•• will ••• 
practice Jaw in a manner that serves the public interest."). See generally Harry T. Edwards, A 
Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1148 (1990). 
13. Edwards, supra note l, at 44. 
14. Id. 
15. Judge Edwards is particularly scathing in his references to ·a passage of mine indicating 
the importance to a person interested in law's effects on behavior of studying behavior, rather 
than simply the law. Id. at 52 (citing Priest, supra note 2, at 439). Judge Edwards somehow 
interprets this passage as evidencing "disdain for Jaw practice," which he finds to be 
"deplorable." Id. I regret that the passage could be misinterpreted this way, in particular, be-
cause I do not disdain Jaw practice. 
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trine. 16 But legal doctrine alone cannot determine effects or define 
either values or the public interest. For example, my essay criticized 
by Judge Edwards addressed law and the social sciences.17 Among 
other challenges the realists posed was the determination of the actual 
societal effects of a legal rule or legal institution. All would surely 
agree that it is important to the definition and justification of the law 
to study such effects. To understand the actual effects of law on soci-
ety, however, it is essential to go beyond the law and legal doctrine 
itself. The law itself possesses neither an internal metric nor a meth-
odology for determining effects. Obviously, the most promising ave-
nues for studying the effects of the law are social sciences that have 
been developed to study effects in other contexts: economics, sociol-
ogy, psychology. Again, attention to legal doctrine alone will not pro-
vide answers to the question. 18 
The rise of other forms of interdisciplinary study in legal scholar-
ship and teaching is similar. To the extent that it is important to un-
derstand the legal system as one of society's political institutions, it is 
important to invoke broader learning about politics and political insti-
tutions, for example, with the study of political science. Again, a focus 
on legal doctrine alone will be insufficient since legal doctrine, on its 
face, is unlikely to reveal political influence or consequence. Similarly, 
when law is viewed as an expression of public values, it is important to 
study the content of those values and, thus, important to develop an 
understanding of philosophy and social theory. Legal doctrine may 
reflect values, but it cannot explain or justify those values, nor can it 
illustrate how those values might best be extended. 
Of course, concerns in legal scholarship and teaching about effects, 
values, or the definition of the public interest were not unknown prior 
to the realists. In my area, tort law, for ex.ample, I have elsewhere 
described Francis Bohlen's "benefit" theory, Jeremiah Smith's "cost 
internalization" point, and Fleming James' ideas about insurance as 
reflecting a partial economic basis.19 · Similarly, one can relate nine-
16. Id. at 56-59. 
17. Priest, supra note 2. 
18. Judge Edwards apparently understands the discipline of law and economics as relevant 
chiefly for determining whether a legal outcome is efficient. Edwards, supra note 1, at 47; id. at 
49 ("The law-and-economics scholar, just like the economist, uses economic analysis to assess 
'efficiency.' "). This highly crabbed view is surely not reflective of the broader impact oflaw and 
economics on legal scholarship and teaching. At another point, Judge Edwards admits that there 
are other forms of law-and-economics research. See id. at 47 n.38. Nevertheless, he does not 
describe what these might be or what role they might have in improving legal understanding or 
law reform. · 
19. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellec-
tual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
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teenth-century tort law doctrine to nascent conceptions of corrective 
justice. What is different about modem legal scholarship, however, is 
the greater rigor of the analysis, indeed, the exponentially greater 
rigor. My colleague Guido Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents20 vastly 
enriched Fleming James' ideas about insurance. The voluminous 
work of William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, in tum, pressed 
forward one aspect of Calabresi's analysis.21 Many modem econo-
mists have attempted further advances.22 Similarly, modem legal phi-
losophers have dramatically refined earlier vague incantations of social 
values.23 Judge Edwards may decry the increase of interdisciplinary 
"law and" scholarship in contrast to doctrinal research, but this re-
search has increased and refined our understanding of the law far be-
yond what generations of doctrinalists had achieved. 
There are additional reasons for the increasing importance of inter-
disciplinary study in modem legal scholarship and teaching. Here it is 
useful to refer to a distinction Judge Edwards has introduced in 
describing the cases that come before him as a federal appellate judge. 
In his essay on legal education and, more extensively, in other writ-
ings,24 Judge Edwards distinguishes three types of cases: "Easy" cases 
are those in which the pertinent rules are unambiguous and their ap-
plication to the case clear. "Hard" cases are those for which there are 
decent arguments for both sides, though one can readily determine a 
resolution. In contrast, "very hard" cases are those in which "after 
reviewing the record and all the pertinent legal materials ... the com-
peting arguments drawn from those sources are equally strong. . . . 
[A] fair application of the law to the facts leaves [the judge] in equi-
poise .... "25 Judge Edwards estimates that, in a given year, fifty 
percent of the cases he faces are easy; thirty-five to forty-five percent, 
20. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
21. For as close a summary of this work as possible, see WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987). 
22. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
23. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 
YALE L.J. 949 (1988). 
24. See Edwards, supra note l, at 44; Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the 
Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wisc. L. REv. 837, 856-63; Harry T. Edwards, 
The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appel-
late Adjudication, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 385, 389-402 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Edwards, The 
Role of a Judge]. 
25. Edwards, The Role of a Judge, supra note 24, at 390. Of course, evaluating cases accord-
ing to the difficulty of resolution need not be constrained to three categories. An economist 
would imagine the existence of a continuum. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selec-
tion of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (discussing economic determinants of 
the difficulty of cases that reach trial or appeal); George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of 
Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980). 
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hard; and five to fifteen percent, very hard.26 
Both legal scholarship and education are directed toward the anal-
ysis of what Judge Edwards regards as "very hard" cases or problems. 
It is not surprising, of course, that legal scholarship should address 
"very hard" cases, and it is difficult to believe that Judge Edwards 
would disapprove of the priority. Because there are no clear or obvi-
ous resolutions to such cases, they provide the greatest opportunity for 
scholarly contribution to the public interest. In addition, such cases 
often implicate public issues of high significance. As a consequence, 
they are most likely to influence extensively the resolution of other 
disputes. 
Cases that Judge Edwards defines as "very hard," however, are 
exactly the cases compelling the most serious interdisciplinary re-
search. According to Judge Edwards' definition, legal doctrine alone 
cannot resolve these cases; there is compelling doctrinal support for 
both sides of the dispute.27 It follows necessarily, therefore, that a 
court must refer to some nondoctrinal source for a resolution. More 
precisely, in a postrealist world, cases with no clear or obvious resolu-
tions are cases in which the societal effects of the legal ruling are hard-
est to determine, the social values implicated by the ruling in greatest 
conflict, or the public interest served by the resolution most difficult to 
define. It follows that these are the cases that compel the most rigor-
ous interdisciplinary study. 
Modem legal education also focuses on very hard cases, necessar-
ily requiring increased interdisciplinary study in law schools. The 
dominant foqn of teaching in law schools is the case method, a 
method of studying not any case and not easy cases, but Judge Ed-
wards' very hard cases. In con.trast to the doctrinal teaching from 
treatises on the Continent and in England, class work in the United 
States consists of students immediately confronting the most difficult 
cases in the respective area of law. As in Judge Edwards' definition, 
cases chosen for the modem casebook present the greatest conflict be-
tween legal principles in which there are compelling arguments avail-
able for both sides. Indeed, such cases are often supplemented by 
hypotheticals that make the issue more difficult by pressing the con-
flicting principles even further than existing caselaw. 
This form of teaching serves several plausible functions. First, it 
probably most effectively sharpens students' legal skills to confront 
them continuously with the most difficult issues of a field of law. Sec-
26. See id. at 389-90. 
27. Id. at 390. 
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ond, it is an efficient technique for mastering doctrine. The case 
method places the student on a narrow, knife-edge ridge of conflicting 
doctrine, enabling a ready survey of the doctrinal landscape on either 
side below. 
This pedagogical method, however, implicates the increasing im-
portance of interdisciplinary study in law schools. Again by defini-
tion, the cases presented to students, like the very hard cases judges 
face, cannot be resolved by the invocation of legal doctrine alone. In 
the postrealist world, effects, values, or the public interest somehow 
defined must be called upon for a resolution. It follows necessarily 
that students as well as faculty must increasingly resort to interdisci-
plinary research and study. 
This example suggests - as admittedly I did not in my earlier 
writings - that interdisciplinary teaching is not strictly antithetical to 
doctrinal teaching, a point I will expand in the next Part. Perhaps this 
is an unfortunate source of the disagreement between Judge Edwards 
and me. To focus principally on very hard cases for which there is no 
doctrinal resolution does not imply the neglect of doctrines controlling 
cases that are easy or merely hard. To the contrary, it is necessary to 
master the two or more lines of conflicting doctrine potentially con-
trolling the dispute in order to appreciate what makes the case so very 
hard. Rather, for the resolution of very hard cases, again by defini-
tion, doctrine is not sufficient. In today's postrealist world, the judge, 
scholar, and student must increasingly tum to interdisciplinary re-
search - in economics, sociology, philosophy, or social theory - to 
understand best how the law can advance the interests of society. 
II. THE "MARKET" FOR LEGAL IDEAS 
Judge Edwards' essay criticizes the increasing disjunction of the 
academy and the bar.28 My earlier work had a similar focus, though I 
approved of the development. 29 Both of us illustrate the point simi-
larly, by contrasting the most advanced theoretical academics with the 
most practical judges and lawyers. This dichotomy between theorists 
and practitioners is engagingly vivid, but I am increasingly convinced 
that it inadequately describes our modem legal establishment. 
Let us once more begin with Judge Edwards' categorization of 
cases as easy, hard, and very hard. Judge Edwards, it should be noted, 
does not oppose theory., His point, instead, is that easy cases can be 
resolved by doctrine alone, without theory; hard and very hard cases 
28. Edwards, supra note 1. 
29. Priest, supra note 3. 
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by varying combinations of doctrine and theory.30 I fully accept his 
description. What determines the respective demands for doctrinal 
and theoretical research on the law? We have discussed that the im-
pact of the realists has increased the need for theoretical research. Are 
other forces involved? 
These remarks are no more than initial speculation on this issue. 
It is very likely, however, that broader economic forces affecting the 
legal profession influence the production of legal scholarship. For ex-
ample, as is well known, the demand for legal services has increased 
substantially in the United States over the past seventy years, generat-
ing large increases in the number of lawyers, in lawyers' earnings, and 
in law school applications.31 Peter Pashigian shows that the number 
oflawyers in the United States more than doubled between 1920 and 
1970.32 The number more than doubled again between 1970 and 
1988.33 This occupational trend, of course, reflects an underlying in-
crease in the volume of litigation, 34 in the level of government regula-
tion, and in the size of the economy as well as, more generally, a 
continued increase in the importance of law and our legal system to 
modern society.3s 
Even at the simplest level of analysis, the increase in the demand 
for and supply of lawyers will generate an increasing division of labor. 
This is hardly a controversial conclusion. It is obvious to any observer 
that the level of specialization among and within modern law firms has 
increased dramatically over the past decades. 
The increasing specialization of legal practice is very likely to be 
accompanied by an increasing specialization of law-related research 
and scholarship. It is, of course, difficult to measure degrees of spe-
cialization in research, but the implication follows from the general 
principle of the division of labor. As the volume and diversity of the 
30. Edwards, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
31. See B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers: The Determinants of the Demand for 
and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 53 (1977); Sherwin Rosen, The Market for Lawyers, 35 
J.L. & EcON. 215 (1992). 
32. Pashigian, supra note 31, at 54 tbl. 1 (counting judges among the total number of 
lawyers). 
33. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL°ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 192 tbl. 314 (112th ed. 1992). 
34. For some evidence at the state court level, see George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the 
Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. REv. 527 (1989). 
35. In my essay on law and the social sciences, Priest supra note 2, I suggested that the 
importance of law and the legal system to a person interested in economics approxima.tes the 
importance of industries such as oil or armament manufacture. Id. at 438. I am now convinced 
that this represents a gross underestimate. The current abject position of the economies of the 
former Soviet and the Eastern European states, which can be attributed in important part to the 
absence of effective legal systems, suggests the far broader economic impact of the law. 
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law become greater and the volume and diversity of legal materials 
become greater, there are greater returns or comparative advantage to 
specialization. The benefits of the division of labor imply greater spe-
cialization in both theoretical and doctrinal research as well as the 
emergence of a variety of intermediate specializations, which, accord-
ing to Judge Edwards' categorization, will incorporate differing combi-
nations of theory and doctrine. 
There is some evidence that these developments are taking place. 
Judge Edwards and I have both noted that individuals who are chiefly 
practicing attorneys rather than full-time academics have increasingly 
dominated production of the doctrinal treatise. 36 At the same time, of 
course, the scope of the typical legal treatise has changed dramatically. 
It is rare to observe a modern equivalent of the magisterial treatises, 
say, of Williston or Corbin encompassing what was then the entirety 
of contract law.37 Today, in their place are multiple treatises address-
ing increasingly detailed contract law subspecialties. Again, at the 
simplest analytical level, it should not be surprising that these texts are 
authored by individuals who are primarily practitioners. The returns 
from mastery of the details of these areas, and thus the comparative 
advantage, are likely to be far greater to a person working day by day, 
hour by hour on these problems than to an academic whose teaching 
touches at best one to two related cases per term. 
Judge Edwards condemns the broader legal academy for aban-
doning the authorship of "practical" doctrinal treatises, invoking the 
contrary examples of Charles Alan Wright and Laurence Tribe.38 But 
his examples are actually proof of the point. First, the Wright and 
Miller and Tribe treatises differ substantially from the average modern 
treatise because of the much broader scope of their subjects, another 
illustration of modern specialization. Second, though Professors 
Wright and Tribe hold distinguished academic positions, on a metric, 
say, of relative proportion of time or income, it may be more accurate 
to regard them as principally practitioners rather than as theorists, 
though practitioners at a highly skilled and specialized level, of course. 
Again, these remarks are no more than a sketch, but it is not im-
plausible that there are similarities between the structure of produc-
tion of legal ideas and the production of intellectual property in other 
36. Id. at 437; cf. Edwards, supra note l, at 36, 49 n.44 (noting that legal academics are 
moving away from treatise writing). For Judge Edwards' broader advocacy of the academic 
production of treatises, see id. at 42-57. 
37. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1950); SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREA· 
TISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920). 
38. Edwards, supra note 1, at 54. 
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industrial contexts. For example, sophisticated firms in industries in 
which there are great returns from new technologies develop a highly 
variegated structure for the generation of new ideas and their reduc-
tion to practice. Such firms support laboratories of research scientists, 
groups of more applied scientists who work with the results of the 
theoretical research, other scientists skilled in making the results prac-
ticable, and still further individuals who transform the product into 
something useful for consumers. 
Indeed, one might predict that, if the demand for legal services and 
the benefit from new legal ideas continue to grow, the legal establish-
ment - both the academy and the bar - will be transformed increas-
ingly to resemble the structure of the high-tech industrial firm. Some 
set of scholars will concentrate principally on theoretical research, 
while others will work at various levels of application, including the 
judiciary, which must necessarily operate at a level of broad general-
ity, and practitioners, who apply ideas day to day to the specific 
problems of their clients. 
This description of the structure of the production of ideas sug-
gests that the difference between legal theoreticians and practitioners 
will continue to grow, but that disjunction or division, which Judge 
Edwards and I have noted,39 misdescribes the relationship. As mem-
bers of a broader legal establishment, theoreticians, and practitioners 
have different responsibilities and must refine different skills in order 
to contribute most effectively to the success of the legal system. But to 
emphasize disjunction or division - and especially hostile disjunction 
and division, as Judge Edwards and I have - substantially distorts 
what is more accurately described as a functionally cooperative rela-
tionship. There is no reason to regard the doctor who skillfully diag-
noses the disease and prescribes the appropriate pharmaceutical as in 
some way hostilely divided from the research scientist who first iso-
lated the viragen or the research chemist whose idea generated the 
drug. They are different individuals, and their talents and skills are 
surely different. It is similarly misdescriptive to regard legal theoreti-
cians as hostilely divided from practitioners who reduce ideas to prac-
tice in order to solve their clients' problems. 
There are substantial differences, of course, between the generation 
of, say, pharmaceuticals and the production of ideas about the law. 
To a far greater degree, pharmaceutical research as well as the produc-
tion of intellectual property in other industrial contexts is constrained 
39. See generally Edwards, supra note l; Priest, supra note 3. 
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within an economic market.4-0 Undoubtedly, research chemists are af-
forded some latitude, but continued years without useful discoveries 
will not be rewarded. 
The "market" for legal ideas - especially within the academy -
is qualitatively different. To describe ideas as subject to a "market" or 
to "free trade" has become commonplace following Holmes' stirring 
dissent in Abrams. 41 The seeming plausibility of the metaphor derives 
from the characteristics of competition among alternatives, choice by 
consumers or citizens among those alternatives according to some 
standard of merit, and, perhaps, from the sense of combative, some-
times distasteful, rigor that many associate with commercial mar-
kets. 42 I believe, however, that the market metaphor is misplaced43 
because these characteristics are not central to the operation of eco-
nomic markets. A need for consumers or citizens to choose among 
sharply competing alternatives is inevitable whenever there are sharply 
competing alternatives, regardless of the form of economic 
organization. 
Economics, in contrast, views the market as an institution for re-
laying information concerning consumer or citizen preferences to di-
rect investment and the allocation of resources in order to maximize 
consumer welfare. Competition among alternatives is an aspect of a 
market, but far more central are prices as well as the incentives and 
disincentives that derive from them in influencing productive invest-
ment to best benefit consumers. 
One can imagine the operation of such an institutional process in 
the context of the production of commercial intellectual property. 
Product sales reward individual firms for generating ideas most useful 
to consumers; presumably the firm appropriately rewards the research 
scientists within the firm in tum. Thus, research investment is di-
40. Again, this essay is meant only to be suggestive, but a fuller comparison would incorpo· 
rate the role of academic research in chemistry to the description of research and development in 
a pharmaceutical firm. If academic chemistry resembles academic law, the industries would ap· 
pear to differ in that, to my knowledge, there is no institution comparable to the corporate re· 
search lab within modern law firms, suggesting a lower degree of specialization within the legal 
establishment. These questions deserve further study. 
41. "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ... the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and .•• 
truth is the only ground upon which ... wishes safely can be carried out." Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
42. See, for example, Justice Brennan's definition of "the central meaning of the First 
Amendment" as the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is· 
sues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caus-
tic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.'' New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 273 (1964). 
43. For other, though different, criticisms of the metaphor, see Stanley Ingber, The Market-
place of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1. 
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rected to those ends most valuable to consumers. It is substantially 
more difficult, however, to identify the exact market analogues with 
respect to the production oflegal ideas or, surely, political ideas - the 
most common subjects of the metaphor. 
Judge Edwards does not address the market for legal ideas di-
rectly, though many of his criticisms of the modem academy are re-
lated. His repeated description of theoretical research in the law as 
"impractical scholarship"44 suggests that he sees no marketlike re-
straint on the legal academy.45 Judge Edwards begins his essay by 
describing his astonishment at the receipt of a letter from a "well-
known law professor," which Judge Edwards interprets as a "frank 
admission that [the professor] is 'unwilling to redirect' his writing in 
useful ways, since he prefers to study whatever 'fascinates' him." 
Judge Edwards compares his correspondent to a · "stamp collec-
tor[ ]."46 Judge Edwards concludes his discussion of modem legal 
scholarship by insisting that" '[p]ersonal fascination' is not a sufficient 
justification for scholarship, of any kind. Insouciant 'pastiches,' which 
no self-respecting academic journal would publish, have no place in 
the law reviews."47 
Again, the market for legal ideas is difficult to describe, and much 
further analysis is needed. In my experience, however, Judge Ed-
wards' views of the legal academy and, in particular, of those who 
regard themselves as theorists are surely inaccurate in part and proba-
bly inaccurate in most respects. There are many examples of eco-
nomic market forces operating directly on the production of legal 
scholarship, thus ensuring some level of utility. At the broadest level, 
the active market within law teaching - the competition among 
schools for the most promising of iegal scholars - suggests that much 
legal scholarship will be responsive to important legal questions. At a 
more direct level, the increasing transformation of articles into short 
books, designed both to attract a different readership and to generate 
royalties, is suggestive. Similarly, the rise of symposia, in particular, 
44. Edwards, supra note l, at 35, 46-56. 
45. I do not wish to mistake Judge Edwards' attitude toward markets from the occasional 
references in his essay. At other points, he condemns modem law firms for their excessive pur-
suit of profit. Id. at 34, 67-74. Pursuit of profit itself may only mean that law firms are increas-
ingly pressing their members to apply their talents toward solving as many client problems as 
possible, which I would regard as a positive influence of the profit motive. Judge Edwards, 
however, seems to be criticizing the way in which law firms are garnering profits - through 
excessive lawyering, overbilling, and unnecessary work - which in economic terms represents 
market failure, rather than success. 
46. Id. at 36. Judge Edwards' interpretation of the letter is surely unfair if his correspondent 
is, say, fascinated by topics that lead to new thinking about the legal system. 
47. Id. at 56. 
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symposia that offer their authors honoraria in order to attract discus-
sion of specific subjects illustrates the direct effect of economic incen-
tives. The operation of marketlike forces that influence the direction 
of scholarly investment is often more subtle, though nonetheless effec-
tive. For example, the common phenomenon of waves of articles fol-
lowing controversial Supreme Court decisions surely indicates 
scholarly responsiveness to relevance. In addition, though the returns 
may not be directly pecuniary, I know of no authors who are indiffer-
ent to readership. The rise of citation counting within the past ten 
years, surely, reflects a concern for relevance. 
Of course, the issue is not simply whether pecuniary returns influ-
ence the choice of topics or the reception of ideas. Judge Edwards' 
criticism is that much of modern legal scholarship, including the por-
tion that regards itself as theoretical, is, in his words, "i1l1practical" -
divorced from the constraints of utility and relevance to legal issues 
facing our society. That some part oflegal scholarship is responsive to 
direct economic incentives or the related incentives that stem from ac-
ademic consulting suggests the limitations of Judge Edwards' claim. I 
do not believe, however, that direct economic incentives influence 
much of modern theoretical scholarship. In the legal academy, the 
forces that influence the choice of research topics and the reception of 
ideas are substantially more subtle and difficult to define precisely. 
Nevertheless, the evident costs to an author of producing legal schol-
arship, even theoretical scholarship, implies the necessary existence of 
some compensating return and, thus, practicality at some level. Fill-
ing in footnotes and editing text are far more tedious than stamp 
collecting. 
Judge Edwards' complaints about the increasing impracticality of 
much of theoretical research are unfair in a different sense. In no field 
are there positive returns from every investment in basic research. In-
deed, in terms of successful inventions per attempt, the dominant out-
put of research laboratories is probably failure. Theoretical research is 
a probabilistic process. 
Research in legal theory, however, is different from the pharma-
ceutical example in one important respect. When economic forces 
constrain research investments, there is likely to be a lower rate of 
failure than when economic forces are largely absent, as in legal the-
ory. Thus, consistent with Judge Edwards' criticism, there is likely to 
be a much wider and less fruitful range of theoretical inquiry in the 
legal academy than in the research department of a high-tech indus-
trial firm. 
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III. JUDGE EDWARDS' REFORM PROPOSALS RECONSIDERED 
Judge Edwards proposes to reform legal scholarship and teaching 
in three ways: First, he hopes to encourage more doctrinal legal schol-
arship that would provide more practical assistance to the judiciary 
and the bar, in contrast to "impractical" theoretical or interdiscipli-
nary work. 48 Second, he hopes to promote more doctrinal teaching -
defined here to include the legal techniques of using doctrine - to 
better prepare law students for law practice substantively and in terms 
oflegal skills. Again, this pedagogical policy would imply a shift away 
from current theoretical or interdisciplinary teaching.49 Finally, he 
wants greater emphasis in the law school curriculum on the prepara-
tion of students for "ethical" practice, which means understanding the 
law as an instrument to promote the public interest and a legal prac-
tice consistent with this end. 50 
First, at the most basic level, I believe that Judge Edwards' goals 
are inconsistent. To view law as an instrument to promote the public 
interest and to study how the legal system can effectuate the public 
interest is the essence of interdisciplinary work. Interdisciplinary 
work - especially in the social sciences and philosophy - consists of 
the study of the effects of law on the citizenry, the values imbedded in 
the law, and how the public interest may best be achieved. Judge Ed-
wards must acknowledge as much, at least with respect to cases he 
regards as "very hard." It follows, however, that the broad encour-
agement and development of Judge Edwards' "ethical" approach to 
the law require more interdisciplinary study and teaching, rather than 
less. Again, the focus on accumulated doctrine alone cannot fulfill this 
ambition. Indeed, it is difficult to believe, given Judge Edwards' 
highly admirable commitment to public service,51 that he would sin-
cerely prefer to substitute the teaching of doctrine for the teaching of 
societal impact and values. 
Second, Judge Edwards' more general preference for shifting the 
balance of doctrinal versus theoretical scholarship and teaching re-
mains problematic. Judge Edwards is surely correct that much of a 
student's doctrinal learning occurs after law school, either in prepara-
tion for the bar examination or in law firm apprenticeship. 52 Whether 
there would be greater returns - more effective practice - from mov-
48. Id. at 42. 
49. Id. at 57·66. 
50. Id. at 66-74. For Judge Edwards' definition of "ethical" teaching and practice, see supra 
note 12. 
51. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 12. 
52. Edwards, supra note 1, at 57-58. 
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ing this apprenticeship more fully back into the law schools is difficult 
to determine. 
Judge Edwards' call for more practical scholarship is equally diffi-
cult to evaluate. As we have seen, the issue involves determining the 
level of specialization that, in economic language, yields the greatest 
return in terms of legal reform. It is equivalent to a high-tech indus-
trial firm deciding whether it should invest more in basic or applied 
research. There is no easy answer to the question. 
The description here of the broader structure of the legal establish-
ment, however, suggests that the question is not answered - in the 
way both Judge Edwards and I attempted in the past - by observing 
the extremes of legal specialization, theoreticians and practitioners; 
commenting on the growing disjunction or division between them; and 
encouraging the one we respectively prefer. It is surely more construc-
tive to attempt to understand the reasons for increased specialization 
and, then, to promote appreciation of the cooperative relationship be-
tween the academy and the bar toward the end of improving our sys-
tem of law. 
